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The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 impelled the district
courts to develop and regularize effective alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) procedures.1 The prevalence of court-annexed ADR programs has
supplanted has, in large measure, supplanted the prior informal procedures
for ad hoc settlement conferences that are conducted mostly by magistrate
judges. The benefits that can be derived from such programs are now viewed
as a positive adjunct to the district court's important considerations of open
accessibility, transparency, fairness, and impartiality in the administration of
justice. Court-annexed mediation programs can also advance the goals of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as defined by Rule 1-to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.2
The approaches taken by the various district courts regarding court-
annexed or court-approved ADR programs have varied over time, no doubt
in part as a reflection of local customs and regional needs for different types
of programs. Our research into district courts' rules concerning ADR
procedures has revealed several patterns. Many courts, including the
Southern District of Ohio, rely on a panel of volunteer mediators who are
willing to conduct settlement or mediation conferences during established
"settlement weeks." Some of these volunteer mediators will also accept
referrals outside of the established settlement week programs in exceptional
or unusual circumstances.
Some courts have adopted the practice of developing a registry of
attorneys who are willing to mediate court-referred cases for a fee. Rules
governing the registry in these districts vary in scope and detail, but they
typically prescribe certain qualifications for registry appointment such as
satisfaction of ADR training requirements or a certain number of years of
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1 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1998).
2 FED. R. C.P. 1.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
legal practice. A few districts have established ADR committees, which may
work with county or state bar associations to generate a registry of qualified
neutrals. Some courts require mediator fee schedules to be filed with the
court's registry, and some expressly provide for court review of the
reasonableness of any fee charged to a litigant. Fees charged by these
mediators are typically shared equally among the parties, although
exceptions to payment may be made for parties demonstrating some financial
need.
The Southern District of Ohio's traditional ADR system is described in
Local Rule 16.3. A judge may refer any civil case (with a few standard
exceptions such as Social Security appeals) for a mediation session or
settlement week conference. 3 The court maintains a roster of experienced
attorneys who are willing to serve as volunteer neutrals under the direction of
the ADR coordinator. In the Southern District, the coordinator is typically a
Magistrate Judge appointed by the Chief Judge. 4 A judge may assign a case
to another type of ADR process only with the consent of all parties. 5
Extensive confidentiality rules operate to protect communications and
statements made during the mediation process. 6
In 2007, the judges of the Southern District decided to expand the
availability of mediation services in our district by hiring a full-time,
professional staff mediator.7 The same open referral procedure in place for
our volunteer mediators applies to our staff mediator, and the same extensive
confidentiality rules also apply. Information about the court's mediation
service and process, including the assurance of confidentiality, is posted on
the court's public website. 8
We also realized the importance of substantively evaluating the services
being provided by our staff mediator, as simple statistics on numbers of
settlements reached are unsatisfactory. 9 To that end, a working group
3 S. D. OHIo Civ. R. 16.3(a)-(b).
4 S. D. OHIO Civ. R. 16.3(d).
5 S. D. OHIO Civ. R. 16.3(a)(1).
6 S. D. OHIO Civ. R. 16.3(c).
7 See, United States District Court-Southern District of Ohio, http://www.ohsd.
uscourts.gov/mediation.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
8 United States District Court-Southern District of Ohio, http://www.ohsd.
uscourts.gov (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
9 Indeed, Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil has said on this subject:
[T]hose who would insist on using only efficiency criteria to assess the
value of ADR programs jeopardize the courts' most precious and only
necessary assets: public confidence in the integrity of the processes the courts
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(including the author, the district court mediator, and the Sixth Circuit's chief
mediator) developed a survey that was distributed to attorneys who had
utilized the services of the court's mediator since the inception of the
service.10 The survey generally asked attorneys to compare and evaluate, on
the basis of several different factors, the mediation or settlement process as
conducted by judges (assigned to the case, non-assigned) or magistrates, the
court's mediator, the court's volunteer mediators, and privately-retained
mediators. The results of that survey are thoroughly presented and analyzed
in the article by Professor Wissler later in this publication, and I will not
attempt to review them in any detail. The results of the survey did, however,
confirm several of my own beliefs and expectations concerning the strengths
and weaknesses of the available settlement options.
Overall, the court staff mediator achieved a higher satisfaction rating
than any of the other alternatives that were surveyed. The court mediator also
received the largest proportion of first-place overall rankings among the
survey respondents. This level of satisfaction was achieved after the Southern
District Court's mediation office had been operating for less than two, and
the results confirmed my belief in the benefits of this service. I am confident
that satisfaction levels will increase as more attorneys and litigants become
familiar with the mediation service and the benefits it provides.
It was also very gratifying to see that lawyers responding to the survey
believed court staff mediators were more likely to leave their clients feeling
better served than they would feel in private mediation, regardless of the
outcome of the process. 11 A primary goal of any court service should be to
provide effective, satisfactory procedures for the resolution of disputes. A
key feature of our mediation program that may be reflected in that outcome is
that the service is provided at no direct cost to any participant.
The reported satisfaction levels were also higher for the staff mediator
than for the volunteer mediators. Professor Wissler notes several factors that
may account for that difference, such as the more limited time availability
sponsor and public faith in the motives that underlie the courts' actions. We
must take great care not to make program design decisions that invite parties to
infer that the courts care less about doing justice and offering valued service
than about looking out for themselves as institutions (e.g., by reducing their
workload, or off-loading kinds of cases that are especially taxing or emotionally
difficult or that are deemed "unimportant").
Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found A Better Way?,
18 01O ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 93, 124 (2002).
10 Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Settlement Procedures: Mediation and
Judicial Settlement Conferences, 26 OH1O ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 271 (2011).
I Id.
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and resulting level of responsiveness to litigant needs.' 2 All of my colleagues
and I are deeply grateful for the hard work and assistance willingly provided
by our mediation volunteers in our settlement week programs over the years.
However, I am aware that settlement weeks are inherently limited by the
number of available volunteers that can be matched with appropriate cases.
Any such volunteer efforts are balanced by the practical reality that the cadre
of experienced litigators who act as our volunteers have their own client
responsibilities. In contrast, the court mediator is a full-time position and his
time is limited only by the number of referred cases.
In addition, the availability of a court staff mediator avoids ethical
concerns that may be implicated when a judge refers parties to a private
mediator outside of our traditional settlement week framework. Any dispute
resolution tool utilized by the court must conform to our important
considerations of open accessibility, transparency of process, fairness, and
impartiality in the administration of justice. The paramount importance of
impartiality may be reflected by the fact that in the Wissler survey, results
demonstrated that assigned judges ranked almost last in the respondents'
preferences for settlement or mediation efforts. 13 Other authors have
explored in depth the ethical difficulties that can arise when judges conduct
settlement conferences or mediation sessions which are ultimately
unsuccessful, and then proceed to preside over a jury trial. 14 In my view, the
same concern for preserving impartiality can arise, when a judge selects a
mediator from an "approved" court list, even if that selection is made on a
rotating basis. Even when the mediator is serving for a reduced fee or pro
bono on that matter, as some district court rules provide, the referral may
create an impression of judicial imprimatur.
Moreover, the creation of an approved list of individual private
mediators may be viewed as an affirmation by the court that those
individuals have certain, perhaps unstated, qualifications and experience that
merit their inclusion on the list. In any mediation program using an approved
12 Id. at 289.
13 Id. at 299. One of the major benefits of the district court mediator is avoiding the
potentially coercive impact of having the assigned district or magistrate judge attempt to
mediate the case. While we, as judges, are usually confident in our ability to put aside
information and opinions that develop during mediation sessions, the lawyers and
litigants may not be so confident that we can remain free of bias. Thus, when lawyers and
litigants' participate in settlement discussions with assigned judges they may be reluctant
to candidly disclose their positions, fearing judge bias. This may significantly diminish
the likelihood of success and diminish parties' overall satisfaction with the process.
14 See, e.g., Peter Robinson, Adding Judicial Mediation to the Debate About Judges
Attempting to Settle Cases Assigned to Them for Trial, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 335.
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list, it would seem prudent to regularize and publish the criteria and the
methods by which individuals are placed on that list, and the process by
which cases are assigned to any listed mediator. It would be important to put
a system in place to ensure that the program and the identified mediators are
serving litigants in a process that comports with the court's ethical mandates.
It may also be difficult to properly evaluate the mediation services provided
by those private individuals over time, and to develop objective criteria by
which individuals should be removed from the list. Professor Wissler notes
in her article that there is a lack of empirical research to date that examines
the different models of mediation services, and this might hinder the
development of evaluation criteria. 15 In any event, these tasks-developing
criteria for appointments, maintaining the registry, and surveying qualitative
results-all would require significant time and attention from district court
judges and staff.
These concerns seem even more critical when a court-approved roster of
mediators are not serving pro bono, but rather are paid by the parties. At a
minimum, fee structures and hourly rates should be fully disclosed to the
court and the parties in advance. In many cases, litigants may struggle to pay
their own lawyer and have difficulty understanding why they are being asked
to pay another lawyer (the mediator) to try to settle the dispute that brought
them before the court. If litigants are unable to afford the cost of a private
mediator, criteria must be developed for excusing participants from paying
fees. These processes, such as defining appropriate tests to determine a
party's ability to pay, whether each judge retains the flexibility to excuse
payment, and procedures to address and resolve any objections to fees, all
must be transparent and evenhanded. District court judges and staff would
have to expend significant amounts of energy to develop these tasks.
These concerns and constraints do not arise when the judge is able to
refer the parties to a no-cost, in-house, experienced mediator. The Southern
District's decision to implement its staff mediation program appears to have
achieved many of the goals it aimed to reach. Judges are able to refer matters
on a case-by-case basis. The availability of the mediator has increased our
collective flexibility in responding to requests from attorneys and their
clients for mediation, as we are not constrained by periodic settlement week
schedules. Nor are we called on to schedule a volunteer mediator to conduct
a session outside of a scheduled settlement week. Employing a court staff has
made the mediation referral process completely transparent, efficient,
inexpensive, and simple for all parties involved.
15 Wissler, supra note 10 at 4.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 26:2-3 20111
